“The big question in Burmese politics these days is whether the military will allow Aung San Suu Kyi to run for the presidency.” With these words, Min Zin opens his latest article on Foreign Policy‘s Democracy Lab blog. His view is that permission, withheld by article 59f of the constitution, will not be granted. I have no reason to challenge Min Zin’s judgment, which seems as sound in this piece as in everything else he writes. Instead, what I want to do is take a quick look at a matter that will confront Myanmar long after a possible Aung San Suu Kyi presidency has ceased to be a live issue. I also want to consider how she might therefore play the political game that will continue to unfold over the next 18 months.

In 1994, Juan J Linz kicked off an important political science debate by publishing a lengthy essay entitled “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” He held that it does. Specifically, he asserted that parliamentary democracy is preferable to presidential – because it is more likely to engineer political stability. Indeed, the argument is explicit in the title of the book in which the essay appears: The Failure of Presidential Democracy. A sentence on page 44 about the virtues of parliamentary systems is especially relevant to Myanmar: “In a multiethnic society without an absolutely dominant group supporting one party and obtaining an absolute majority, a parliamentary system would offer the possibility of coalition formation and consociational type of agreements, which could provide a flexible response to ethnic conflict.” As is the way with all debates in political science, Linz’s conclusion is contested. But there is still considerable support for the proposition that parliamentary systems are the better bet for divided societies – not winner takes all (as in presidentialism), but big tent accommodation of disparate interests (as in parliamentarism).

Of course Myanmar has a hybrid political system in which a direct parliamentary election builds a platform for an indirect presidential election. (There is also the further hybridity introduced by military appointees, but for today that need not be an issue.) Crucially, though, the system remains fluid, and could be shaped in a variety of ways once constitutional reform takes place. An “imperial” presidency is quite conceivable. So too is a parliamentary system with a powerless “figurehead” presidency. The events of the next few years are likely to determine which path the country takes.

Back, then, to Aung San Suu Kyi. Last year she stated publicly that she would like to be president, and at no point since has she signaled a change of mind. Yet a better strategy would surely be to run for the speakership of the Lower House, and from there seek to guide Myanmar in the direction of a parliamentary system. Speaker Thura Shwe Mann has already demonstrated the position’s considerable potential. Following on, the NLD leader would be well placed to expand the powers of parliament still further. Moreover, article 59f has no bearing on election to the speakership.

None of this is an argument against constitutional reform, which remains necessary. Rather, it is an argument for identifying the path of institutional development most suited to Myanmar, and placing the formidable figure of Aung San Suu Kyi firmly on it.