Part of the problem in Rakhine State is that the more outsiders throw up their hands in horror at what’s going on, the more (Buddhist) insiders develop a siege mentality and cast themselves as victims of an uncomprehending world. UN statements, GCR2P monitors, HRW reports, MSF testimony, high-profile commentary and the entire panoply of global reaction (including this blog if it’s read in western Myanmar) all have the counterproductive effect of boosting local hostility to foreign engagement. What to do when even talking the talk inflames the situation?
For sure outsiders are not about to take a collective vow of silence. Neither should they. The international community has a rock-solid legitimate concern for human rights the world over, and cannot be expected to fence off Rakhine and let events there simply take their course. The issue, then, is not how to close down global interest, but rather how to try to make it more understandable and, hopefully, more acceptable to people on the receiving end. There are at least two tasks here.
The first is boosting local awareness of the foundations of global engagement. IR 101 teaches that state sovereignty, enshrined in the UN Charter, is the organizing principle of international society. However, there are circumstances in which even that core principle can be overridden. One set appears in chapter VII of the Charter, dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Another set features in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit outcome document, dealing with the responsibility to protect.
Chapter VII is not currently relevant to the situation in Rakhine State, but R2P certainly is. Endorsed unanimously by UN member states, it provides for international engagement in cases of four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. I wonder: Do people across the country know that Myanmar is a full signatory to R2P? Do they have any sense of how the four mass atrocity crimes are generally defined? Have paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit outcome document (totaling little more than 250 words) been translated into local languages? It strikes me that a major public information campaign needs urgently to be conducted.
The second issue is yet more difficult. By itself, abstract awareness of R2P principles is not likely to change much inside Rakhine State. Rather, there also needs to be a committed attempt to spread real grassroots understanding. R2P has minimal purchase – just the four mass atrocity crimes. Within that limited realm, though, it mandates that protection be provided not simply to citizens, but actually to populations. All people, including those who are alien or stateless, must be safeguarded from these crimes. This aspect of today’s global R2P norm needs to be spoken the length and breadth of the country – by politicians, religious figures, civil society workers, community leaders, teachers, and many others.
So much more can be done to talk about R2P in Rakhine State, and localize a conversation currently conducted above all in New York, Geneva and key parts of the humanitarian diaspora. Moreover, unless this is done, and done quickly, the international community really cannot say it’s tried its best to deliver on the core R2P mandate in Myanmar.