Reaching back to the Second World War, Sadan writes that “The experience of war redefined Burmese nationalism” (270). Basic concepts such as dominion, federation and union all had to be given a fresh focus and new precision. Across the country, established elites were challenged by youth groups moulded by fighting. Underground movements began to develop as distinctive encounters with warfare pointed to divergent postwar futures.

The first Panglong conference, held in March 1946, exposed a lack of trust between national and ethnic leaders. Aung San, initially not invited, subsequently declined to attend. The second and more famous Panglong conference, held in February 1947, was in essence a response to British insistence that Aung San prove his ability to rule the entire nation. It therefore sought “primarily to speed up the process of independence rather than attempt to determine all details with absolute clarity beforehand” (272).

The resultant agreement was widely believed to be but one stage in a long negotiation process. Many of the people covered by it had never before been governed by Burmans. The distance between leaders of the majority community and leaders of the many minorities was in some cases so great as to count as “almost total separation” (275). Thakin Nu was a particularly divisive figure.

Small wonder, then, that today’s ethnic minority leaders, conscious of the rapid collapse of dialogue once ink on the Panglong Agreement was dry, are often circumspect in engaging with the peace process.