Looking more deeply into the issue of inter-communal tension and discord in Rakhine State is a brief analysis by Dr Tatsushi Arai posted online in December 2013, and published by 7 Day News Journal in Myanmar in January 2014. It draws on fieldwork and workshops conducted with diverse sets of stakeholders in Sittwe, Yangon and other parts of Myanmar in August 2013. Here I simply present a brief summary.

Arai recognizes the short-term need to keep Buddhists and Muslims apart in some parts of Rakhine as fear of imminent attack is great. However, he argues for holding construction of physical barriers to a bare minimum, so that possibilities for contact remain open. Better still would be not to build barriers at all.

In the medium to long term, Arai focuses on creation of a broad-based international platform. Linking with the Myanmar government, and indeed responding to its request, it should be led by ASEAN or one or more of its members (such as Indonesia), and draw in a range of other actors including Bangladesh, China, Japan, Korea, the UN, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Arai describes its function in this way: “The platform’s primary purpose is to work side by side with Myanmar’s central government and the Rakhine State government within a well-defined mandate and timeframe to provide technical and economic support for addressing the root causes and far-reaching consequences of the ongoing crisis.” In particular, it would be allocated tasks relating on the one hand to citizenship, and on the other to inclusive development and reconciliation. Throughout its mission would be to collaborate closely with the Myanmar government.

On citizenship, the platform would be asked first to examine the causes and consequences of inter-communal violence witnessed since 2012. Second, it would be required to establish clear grounds, consistent with international standards, for currently ineligible persons (mainly Rohingya Muslims) to claim Myanmar citizenship. Third, its input could be sought on boosting security particularly along the border with Bangladesh to prevent further illegal immigration. Fourth, it could help to ensure that full political, economic and civil rights are extended to individuals gaining Myanmar citizenship by means of this process, and that realistic options are outlined for those denied it (such as lodging formal applications or resettling elsewhere).

On inclusive development and reconciliation, the platform could advise on urban and rural development strategies targeted notably at low-income groups. It could sponsor interfaith dialogue focused on common causes such as economic misery and social inequity. It could support resettlement of IDPs and refugees. It could seek to create safe and hospitable social spaces in which people from distinct communities can come together to reflect on their trauma, process their suppressed fear and anxiety, and share experiences of healing.

It’s now several months since this important and constructive agenda for a viable future for Rakhine State was devised. Arai argues that the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, established at the Eighteenth ASEAN Summit in Jakarta in May 2011, could play an essential role in taking it forward. His proposal also merits analysis and debate in broader policy circles.