I hesitated before posting this item. On one side, debates about citizenship are deeply contentious in Myanmar and verge on poisonous when the status of the Rohingya community is addressed. On the other, I’m honestly not sure whether what I have to say is of any value. In looking here at the issue of Rohingya citizenship, I therefore write tentatively, fully conscious that my proposal might be of no use whatsoever.

The starting point is the current state of play: the Burma Citizenship Law, passed on October 15, 1982 and still in force today. That establishes a cut-off point in 1823, the year before Britain’s first major military intervention. As is well known, it lists eight major ethnic groups that had settled in Burma prior to that date and therefore count as nationals. Separate schedules name 135 ethnic groups nested within the eight major national races. It also provides for associate and naturalized citizenship.

Additionally, the 1982 law allows for recognition of further ethnic groups (possibly informed by the fact that a 1972 list contained 144 groups). In the unofficial translation, article 4 says this: “The Council of State may decide whether any ethnic group is national or not.” Quite how this provision is to be interpreted when the country no longer has a Council of State is, though, unclear. The result is that there is currently much dispute about the designation of national minorities and ethnic groups. Particularly problematic is the Rohingya minority which, for varying reasons, is widely held to have no organic place within the society.

What to do about this? In November 2012, the ICG noted that quite a lot could be achieved on the basis of existing legislation. “If the 1982 law had been applied without active discrimination by local officials against Rohingya, the majority of them would have long ago achieved full citizenship.” In one of a series of recent analyses, Derek Tonkin made a similar argument: “Enlightened senior officials incline to the view that up to 90% of ‘Rohingya’ ought to be granted citizenship, but this view is probably not shared by some of their more conservative colleagues, or by officials in Rakhine State.” While these are valid points, they do not address the problem of finding a means to recognize the Rohingya people as an ethnic group. Meanwhile, the road to genocide remains open.

As I said before, I truly don’t know what to suggest as a way forward. However, one possibility might be to make use of a distinction between national and immigrant minorities employed in examination of multicultural western states. National minorities are historic sub-state groups with distinct ethnic identities. Immigrant minorities are groups with a more recent presence inside the state. Myanmar already categorizes its eight major national races as national minorities. In principle, it could also open up a category of immigrant minority, and allow the Rohingya minority (and possibly other groups too) to bid for recognition within it. Critically, individuals in this category would have identical citizenship to everyone else.

I acknowledge that this proposal is unlikely to garner much support. Existing national minorities will object to an extension of equal citizenship to a group broadly viewed as having no place in the society. Rohingyas will be extremely wary of abandoning historical claims to national minority status. Moreover, this latter concern is well founded, for if not handled carefully this pathway could in practice lead directly back to second-class citizenship. The reason for nevertheless floating the idea is that a grand bargain of this kind, in which all major players make key concessions, could be necessary for Myanmar to manage one of the most difficult political challenges it faces.